Although auditory verbal hallucinations are often thought to denote mental illness, the majority of voice hearers do not satisfy the criteria for a psychiatric disorder. Here, we report the first functional imaging study of such nonclinical hallucinations in 7 healthy voice hearers comparing them with auditory imagery. The human voice area in the superior temporal sulcus was activated during both hallucinations and imagery. Other brain areas supporting both hallucinations and imagery included fronto temporal language areas in the left hemisphere and their contralateral homologues and the supplementary motor area (SMA). Hallucinations are critically distinguished from imagery by lack of voluntary control. We expected this difference to be reflected in the relative timing of prefrontal and sensory areas. Activity of the SMA indeed preceded that of auditory areas during imagery, whereas during hallucinations, the 2 processes occurred instantaneously. Voluntary control was thus represented in the relative timing of prefrontal and sensory activation, whereas the sense of reality of the sensory experience may be a product of the voice area activation. Our results reveal mechanisms of the generation of sensory experience in the absence of external stimulation and suggest new approaches to the investigation of the neurobiology of psychopathology.
Introduction
While most humans are able to imagine the voices of familiar people, for some, this becomes an uncontrollable perceptual experience, manifested as auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH). Although AVH can be highly distressing and certain types are diagnostic of schizophrenia, many people who experience AVH do not suffer from mental illness. A recent review of hallucinations in the general population reported a median lifetime prevalence of 4% (van Os et al. 2009 ). It is likely that the majority of these experiences are benign and do not require treatment; some people even find their hallucinated voices useful (Jackson 2007) . One general population survey found that only 25% of its respondents who reported auditory hallucinations fulfilled the criteria for a psychotic disorder (Johns et al. 2002) . Although subclinical psychotic experiences (hallucinations and delusions) represent a risk factor for developing psychosis (Poulton et al. 2000) , the outcome in most cases is favorable.
Few studies have directly compared clinical and nonclinical voice hearers, and all have investigated psychosocial rather than neurobiological factors. The form of voices and their pragmatic properties are much the same between the 2 groups, but clinical voice hearers report more negative content, and they have more negative beliefs about voices and are more distressed by their experiences (Romme and Escher 1989; Leudar et al. 1997; Honig et al. 1998; Davies et al. 2001; Jones et al. 2003; Andrew et al. 2008; Sommer et al. 2008; Sorrell et al. 2010) . There is some evidence that clinical voice hearers have experienced more severe trauma, such as childhood sexual abuse, which leads them to develop more negative beliefs about voices and thus become more distressed by them (Honig et al. 1998; Andrew et al. 2008) .
The brain mechanisms of AVH, however, remain poorly understood. Several functional neuroimaging studies investigated brain activity during AVH in patients with schizophrenia and identified a contribution from fronto temporal language circuits, including parts of auditory cortex (Allen et al. 2008 ). However, the brain correlates of nonclinical hallucinations have not been investigated before. Moreover, it is unclear how brain mechanisms of hallucinations differ from those of auditory imagery (AI). Previous qualitative comparisons have suggested that imagery and hallucinations are associated with overlapping neural networks (Allen et al. 2008) . We expected to find such overlap not only in fronto temporal language circuits (McGuire et al. 1996; Shergill et al. 2001 ) but also in an area specifically involved in processing human voices, which has been localized in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Belin et al. 2000) and related to the special social importance of the voice of conspecifics (Campanella and Belin 2007) . To this end, we localized the human voice area in all participants and tested its activation during hallucinations and imagery.
However, although overlap of neural networks can explain the similarities between the 2 kinds of perceptual experience, it cannot explain the prominent differences in subjective control of generating or terminating a particular thought or percept (i.e., control in the psychological sense). While mental imagery is under volitional control, hallucinations typically occur spontaneously. If hallucinations and imagery share neural networks that mediate the perceptual quality of the experiences, the differences in subjective control must be represented in differential network dynamics. One candidate neural network mechanism that may underlie experienced control is the chronometric communication between brain areas for voluntary motor acts and sensory perception. For example, during speech production, motor areas may send a copy of the speech motor plan to sensory areas in order to predict the sensory consequences of self-produced speech. This forward communication has been suggested to underlie the attribution of sensory events to an internal (i.e., self-produced) or external source (Wolpert et al. 1995; Frith 2005) . In this model, improper forward signaling may impair source attribution, causing internally generated events to be attributed to an external source, which may lead to hallucinatory perceptions. We therefore hypothesized that the timing of activation onsets between areas involved in action planning and sensory processing differentiates imagery from hallucinations.
We assessed brain activity associated with nonclinical hallucinations with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) using the blood oxygen level--dependent (BOLD) signal as correlate of neural activity. We performed 2 control experiments with a different group of participants, one in which they imagined other people talking to them at experimentally determined times and one in which they self-paced their AI. We compared hallucination and imagery-related activation against a resting baseline and against external stimulation with voice sounds. We contrasted imagery and hallucinations to quantify differential activity, and we compared the temporal sequence of brain activity between hallucinations and imagery. We did not investigate experience-related differential activity within the same individuals because hallucinations were too frequent to allow for periods in which we could test imagery alone in the nonclinical hallucinators.
In short, we expected both hallucinations and imagery to engage the human voice area and areas of fronto temporal language circuits, thereby reflecting the perceptual qualities shared by both mental experiences. We furthermore expected activation in prefrontal areas to precede activation of sensory areas during imagery, reflecting the sequence of active generation of the percept, but to be instantaneous during hallucinations.
Materials and Methods

Participants
Nonclinical Hallucinators
Seven nonclinical hallucinators without history of psychiatric or neurological illness were recruited (mean age 45 years, range 21--63, 2 males, all right-handed) from respondents to adverts in local newspapers and the university's intranet. The nonclinical hallucinators were assessed with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay et al. 1987) and their mean scores were 12 for positive symptoms (range 10--14), 7 for negative symptoms (range 7--8), and 18 for general psychopathology (range 16--22) . The group's mean score for PANSS hallucination was 5, indicating that the group's hallucinations were moderate-severe. The PANSS data suggested no other psychiatric symptoms. Two participants reported first-degree relatives with psychosis (in one case the mother and in the other the daughter). None of the hallucinators were taking (or had previously taken) antipsychotic medication; none of them had taken any illicit drugs, and none reported a history of neurological illness or alcohol abuse. None of them was taking psychoactive drugs at the time of examination. An influence of drugs or alcohol was further excluded by absence of signs of intoxication or withdrawal during any of the examinations. All were either in paid employment or studying full-time. For the majority, voices had always been present since childhood and felt like a natural part of everyday life. The mean length of time since onset of hearing voices was 26 years (range 3--58).
Five participants described their voices as spirits of people who have died (H2 and H4--H7), and one participant described her voices as the result of telepathy with living creatures (H1). Three of them (H1, H2, and H7) had embarked upon new careers using their voices to give spiritual readings. Only one participant (H3) believed that her voices were a product of her creative brain and did not exist in reality. No participant believed that their voices were a sign of mental illness, and all felt that their voices were useful and meaningful and had enriched their lives. No participant was distressed by their experiences, and all described neutral conversations with second-person voices while being scanned. We measured their attitude toward their voices with the revised Beliefs About Voices Questionnaire (Chadwick et al. 2000) . They scored 0.5 for malevolence (possible range 0--18, thus our group is close to the minimum), 12 for benevolence (scale max. 18, thus mostly benevolent voices), 5 for omnipotence 0--18 (scale max. 18, thus voices were not judged as very powerful), 3 for resistance (scale max. 27, thus voices were hardly ever resisted), and 17 for engagement (scale max. 24, thus mostly voices were engaged). Only one participant (H3) thought that the voices were internally generated, and all others gave them an external origin.
AI Participants
For the AI experiment, 7 participants without history of psychiatry or neurological illness were recruited (mean age 31 years, range 19--40, 2 males, 1 left-handed). For the control experiment with self-paced AI, 3 out of this group of participants were recruited (mean age 32 years, range 21--40, 2 males, all right-handed). The most commonly reported strategy for the AI experiment was imagining the voices of familiar people, such as family members in conversation or leaving phone messages.
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
All participants were scanned on the Philips 3 Tesla Achieva system at the Brain Imaging Unit of the School of Psychology, Bangor University. During the hallucination periods, participants reported the on-and offset of hallucination by button press with their right hand. Each hallucinator underwent between 2 and 4 fMRI runs of 330 s (average 3). They experienced on average 21 periods of hallucinations (7 per scanning run) with a mean duration of 9 s during a session. This average duration of hallucination period was used to design the AI experiment, in which participants were instructed with a visual cue, presented through a mirror mounted to the head coil, to engage in imagery for 21 periods of 9 s, split into 3 runs of 160 volumes each, alternating with rest periods. The participants of the self-paced AI experiment, where no cue was used, reported on average 7.5 episodes per run, with a mean duration of 23 s. They, too, underwent 3 runs each.
We used a gradient echo EPI (echo-planar imaging) sequence for functional imaging (20 slices of 5 mm, no gap, in-plane voxel size 3 3 3 mm, slice thickness = 5 mm, time repetition [TR] = 1.5 s, time echo = 30 ms, 220 time points). For the voice area localizer (stimuli courtesy of the Voice Neurocognition Laboratory at the Department of Psychology, Glasgow University; http://vnl.psy.gla.ac.uk/resources_main.php), 15-s blocks of human nonspeech voices (V) alternated with nonhuman sounds (S) and rest (R) to yield 8 blocks of each condition per run in the following manner: RSVSVRVSVSR, and so forth.
Although the localizer procedure for the temporal voice area was initially developed for sparse sampling with a TR of 10 s, it is also possible with continuous sampling against the background of the scanner noise. Stimuli were presented using the E-prime software package (Psychology Software Tools) and delivered through the scanner's headphone system at maximum output. All participants reported comfortably hearing the stimuli even in the presence of scanner noise.
Data Analysis FMRI data were preprocessed with the Brainvoyager software (Brain Innovation). We corrected for head movement with 3D motion correction, removed linear trends, and filtered data temporally (high pass: 3 cycles per run; Gaussian temporal filter with 2.8-s full-width at half-maximum, FWHM) and spatially (Gaussian filter with 4-mm FWHM). We applied no temporal high-pass filter to runs with fewer than 6 periods of hallucinations in order to preserve signals of interest. We aligned functional with anatomical data sets and transformed both into Talairach space using a 12-point rigid body transformation. We analyzed the functional data for hallucination and imagery runs statistically with a general linear model (GLM) with the ''voice'' predictor as effect of interest and the 6 parameters from the motion correction in Cartesian space as nuisance variables. The voice predictor was constructed by convolving a boxcar function with the value ''1'' for time points with hallucinations/imagery and ''0'' for all other time points with a standard 2 gamma hemodynamic response function. We analyzed the voice localizer runs with a GLM with the predictors ''voice stimulus'' and ''sound stimulus'' and the 6 motion correction parameters. The predictors voice stimulus and sound stimulus were constructed by convolving boxcar functions assuming the value 1 for the Cerebral Cortex February 2011, V 21 N 2 331 voice or sound blocks and 0 for the remainder of the run with the hemodynamic reference function. We identified the human voice area with the contrast voice stimulus versus sound stimulus following the procedure of Belin et al. (2000) . Voxels were accepted as significantly activated if they exceeded a criterion threshold of P < 0.05, corrected for the false discovery rate (FDR).
For the hallucination experiment, we computed a random-effects multisubject GLM across all 7 participants. For the AI experiment, we computed a random-effects multisubject GLM across all 7 participants. Effects were thresholded at an initial voxel-level threshold of P < 0.005, which was then corrected at the cluster-corrected false-positive level of P = 0.05 (Forman et al. 1995) . In this procedure, statistical maps were randomly generated from a normal distribution and thresholded using the initial voxel-level threshold, more than 1000 iterations. After each iteration, the surviving voxel clusters were tabulated, which ultimately resulted in a distribution of cluster sizes. The smallest cluster size that survived a false-positive threshold of 0.05 was set as the cluster size threshold for the main statistical map. For the self-paced AI experiment, we computed a fixed-effects GLM, thresholded at P < 0.05, FDR corrected.
For the region of interest (ROI) analysis, we used the voice areas identified by the localizer experiment and extracted the beta values of the voice predictor for the hallucination and AI experiments for individual subjects. We tested for differences against baseline with a one-sample t-test.
We estimated the latency of activation onset in individual areas for single trials of the unsmoothed time courses using the BOLD latency mapping plugin in Brainvoyager. BOLD latencies were estimated according to a piece-wise linear (trapezoidal) model fit of the eventrelated response (Richter et al. 2000) , yielding the parameters onset time, amplitude, and duration for a parsimonious description of singletrial time courses (Formisano et al. 2002) . Confidence intervals were based on the variance of single-trial parameter estimates and assumption of a t-distribution around the mean. The differential pattern of activation sequences between groups was analyzed with 2 3 2 repeated measures analyses of variance with the factors group (hallucinations vs. imagery) and area (comparing supplementary motor area [SMA] with left and right STS and left and right inferior frontal gyrus [IFG] , respectively). We chose this approach because we mainly expected timing differences between SMA and the other areas but not among the IFG and STS areas.
Results
Whole-Brain and Voice Area ROI Analysis for Hallucinations
In the first experiment, we investigated 7 nonclinical hallucinators who reported frequent moderate-to-severe AVH and had no history of mental illness. Hallucinators reported their spontaneously occurring hallucinations during fMRI by button press (Dierks et al. 1999) . For each hallucinator, the sequence of button presses was used as predictor variable for modeling hallucination-related brain activity in a GLM. The average duration of hallucination periods was 9 s. To identify voiceselective areas for each hallucinator, we performed a separate localizer experiment (Belin et al. 2000) , which revealed higher activity for voice than for nonvoice sounds in the bilateral STS in each individual (Fig. 1b and Supplementary Table 1 ). We used these STS areas of each hallucinator as ROI and found significant activity during periods of AVH (compared to baseline: t(13) = 2.437, P = 0.03) (Fig. 1c) . In a whole-brain analysis, we furthermore found a network of fronto--temporo--parietal areas that included language areas in the left hemisphere (Broca's area in the left IFG and Wernicke's area in the left planum temporale) and their right-sided homologues as well as prefrontal areas, left primary motor cortex (associated with the button press), the bilateral cerebellum, the inferior parietal lobules, the thalami, and bilateral areas along the STS beyond the voice-selective ROIs (Fig. 1a and Table 1 ). When we contrasted the activity during hallucinations with that during the external voice stimulation from the same individuals, the parietal, SMA, cerebellar, and thalamic activation remained significant, but not that of auditory cortex (Table 1) , supporting the view that overlapping auditory areas subserve hallucinations and the processing of sound.
Whole-Brain and Voice Area ROI Analysis for Imagery
In the first control experiment, we tested whether activation of the human voice area could be obtained when participants engaged in voluntary imagery of speech. Seven different, healthy nonhallucinating participants were instructed to imagine one or several familiar voices speaking to them for 21 periods of 9 s each, thus mimicking the duration of the voices of the nonclinical hallucinators. We again functionally localized voice-selective areas in each participant and performed both ROI and whole-brain analysis of imagery-related activity. The individually defined voice-selective ROIs along the bilateral STS (Fig. 2b and Supplementary Table 1) were significantly active during AI (t(13) = 3.594, P = 0.003) (Fig.  2c) , similar to the finding for hallucinations. Activity during AI outside these ROIs included bilateral fronto temporal networks and prefrontal cortex (Fig. 2a and Table 2 ), again conforming to areas activated during hallucination periods in the hallucinators. In contrast, we did not find activity in the inferior parietal areas and thalamus. In addition, AI was associated with prominent bilateral basal ganglia activation centered on the striatum and activity in the cuneus.
Whole-Brain Comparison between Hallucinations and Imagery
The analysis of hallucination-and imagery-related activation patterns yielded partly overlapping results. This is plausible, considering the perceptual similarities between these 2 phenomena. However, there are also important phenomenological differences, for example, in the vividness and the experience of self-control. We therefore computed a direct whole-brain contrast between the hallucination-and imagery predictors across groups. Activation differed in the inferior parietal lobule bilaterally, in the left middle frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate cortex, the left Heschl's gyrus, and along the calcarine sulcus bilaterally (Table 3 ). The latter areas constitute primary auditory and visual cortex. In all these areas, the contrast was driven by higher activation for hallucinations in comparison with imagery. For the primary sensory cortices, brain activity was suppressed during imagery.
Comparison of Activation Timing between Hallucinations and Imagery (Cued and Self-Paced)
We assessed differences in onset of activity (Formisano and Goebel 2003) between motor planning and perception-related brain areas that were activated during imagery and hallucinations. During AI, SMA became activated first, followed by IFG and STS with a latency of approximately 1.5--2.5 s (Fig. 3 and Table 4 ). During hallucinations, the onset of activity of these areas occurred almost instantaneously within 1 s (Fig. 3 and Table 4 ). This group difference in latencies between SMA and other parts of the network was confirmed statistically by significant area 3 group interactions for SMA and left STS (F 1,12 = 4.67, P = 0.05) and SMA and left IFG (F 1,12 = 9.65, P = 0.009) and a trend for SMA and right IFG (F 1,12 = 3.49, P = 0.09).
In order to exclude the possibility that these timing differences were caused by differences in instruction or response mode, we performed a second control experiment, in which participants were instructed to imagine voices without an external cue and to signal their on-and offset by button press with their right hand, similar to the hallucination experiment. Here again, SMA activity started significantly before the STS with latency differences of approximately 2 s, confirming the activation sequence as a differentiating factor between imagery and hallucinations (Table 5) .
We excluded the possibility that latency differences between SMA and STS were caused by a generally slower hemodynamic response function for STS in the imagery group (e.g., caused by the age difference between groups) by comparing the activation onset latency estimates for left and right STS for the voice localizer experiment. Here, the activation onset was descriptively even faster in the imagery than in the hallucination group (left: 3.1 vs. 3.6 s: right: 3.0 vs. 3.9 s), but these differences were not significant (left: t(12) = 1.05, P > 0.1; right: t(12) = 1.39, P > 0.1).
Discussion
In our study, we compared brain activity of nonclinical hallucinators with activity during auditory mental imagery. The human voice area and fronto-temporal language networks were active during both hallucinations and AI. However, brain activity during hallucinations differed from activity during imagery in the relative timing between prefrontal and superior temporal areas, which was instantaneous during hallucinations but showed a temporal sequence from SMA to STS during active imagery. The activation of fronto temporal and thalamic networks during nonclinical hallucinations coincides with previous reports of brain activity during periods of AVH in schizophrenia patients (Silbersweig et al. 1995; Dierks et al. 1999; Shergill et al. 2000) . Activity of fronto-temporal networks, including parts of the STS, has also been reported for AI (McGuire et al. 1996; Aleman et al. 2005) , and one might expect a certain amount of overlap considering the similarities in perceptual experience between the 2 states.
Activation of the Human Voice Area
The voice-selective area on the banks of the STS, which has not been previously functionally localized in studies of AI or inner speech, was activated consistently during spontaneous auditory hallucinations and voluntarily controlled AI of voices. This activation of the human voice area reveals for the first time for the auditory domain that brain regions that are sensitive to the social context of stimuli can be activated in the absence of external sensory stimulation. The voice area may contribute to the vividness and reality that distinguish hallucinations and imagery from internally generated thoughts that do not assume a sensory quality, and its activation may also reflect the specific human nature of the majority of imagined and hallucinated voices. How then can the human voice area become active in the absence of external acoustic stimulation? Spontaneous activation of sensory areas (Hunter et al. 2006 ) has been described in cases of sensory deprivation or during epileptic seizures. Local spontaneous activity may underlie certain types of hallucinations, for example, visual hallucinations of Charles Bonnet syndrome (Ffytche 2005) and possibly imagery of music without lyrics (Kraemer et al. 2005) . However, spontaneous STS activity by itself may not fully explain the highly structured linguistic content of the reported hallucinations, which is likely derived from activity of fronto temporal networks in the dominant hemisphere, including Broca's and Wernicke's areas (Allen et al. 2008 ). Alternatively, activity may start in temporal cortex in some cases of pathological hallucinations (Lennox Shergill et al. 2004; Hoffman et al. 2008 ) before spreading to other parts of the network, but our findings in the nonclinical hallucinators do not support such a model.
Differences between Hallucinations and Imagery
Brain areas that showed increased activity during hallucinations thus overlapped to a large extent with those that showed activity during AI of voices. Although some degree of overlap was expected, we were interested in any neural differences that might explain the difference in subjective control, which is characteristically absent from the experience of hallucinations in all modalities. The genesis of such uncontrollable sensory experience may derive from an altered forward model of sensory predictions (Wolpert et al. 1995; Ford et al. 2001; Frith 2005) . Under normal circumstances, the motor system generates a forward model that predicts perceptual consequences on the basis of known actions, which influences the experience of the consequences of self-generated actions (Wolpert et al. 1995) , for example, resulting in our inability to tickle ourselves (Blakemore et al. 1998) . During speech production, motor planning areas such as SMA may be involved in monitoring of speech by modulating activity of auditory perception areas (van de Ven et al. 2009) . When this modulation effect is impaired, for example, through disturbed timing of activation between SMA and auditory areas, auditory perception areas may process covert speech as if it came from an external source, resulting in the hallucinatory perception of voices (Frith 2005) . Such dysfunctional timing between premotor and sensory areas could lead to impaired monitoring of inner speech, which has been implicated in the generation of AVH (Allen et al. 2007 ).
Our results revealed premature activation of auditory regions with respect to areas associated with action planning and ideation in hallucinations compared with active imagery of voices. Crucially, in the case of AI, activity in the SMA complex preceded temporal lobe activity. The SMA is part of a cortical complex that supports not only the planning of movements (Nachev et al. 2008 ) but also the ideation of speech (McGuire et al. 1996) . This sequence of brain areas conforms to a model in which ideation and planning of the imaginary conversation precede the formulation of the content through speech (Broca's area) and the subsequent perceptual experience (human voice area in the STS). Our findings support the qualitative description based on the experience frequently expressed by hallucinators ''that the voices express their thoughts before they have a chance to think them themselves'' (Jaynes 1976) .
We empirically verified that the differential onset latencies were not an artifact of group differences in local hemodynamic delays by comparing STS time courses from the voice localizer experiment as well, which did not show the increased latencies observed during imagery. Furthermore, previous studies showed that medial frontal and superior temporal areas show similar latencies of neural and fMRI BOLD responses (Strobel et al. 2008) , which suggests that our BOLD latencies have a neural (Logothetis et al. 2001 ) rather than hemodynamic origin. Although the fMRI BOLD signal acts as a low-pass filter of neural activity (Boynton et al. 1996; Logothetis et al. 2001) , which limits its temporal resolution, it may be sensitive to transient neurophysiological events in the 100-ms range (Menon and Kim 1999) . These findings suggest that fMRI may be sensitive enough to reveal the chronometric architecture of mental events. Indeed, recent attempts at chronometric fMRI alone (Menon et al. 1998; Richter et al. 2000; Formisano et al. 2002; Sigman et al. 2007) or informed by electroencephalography (Brinkmeyer et al. 2010 ) have revealed plausible activation sequences of BOLD activity that matched latencies of neuronal firing known from intracranial recordings in the range below 100 ms (Brinkmeyer et al. 2010) . Furthermore, studies of antecedent brain activity of volitional acts (Soon et al. 2008) suggest that this process may be best captured at a temporal resolution in the second range, thereby making it even more likely that fMRI can capture the regional latencies underlying volitional acts (Menon and Kim 1999; Formisano and Goebel 2003) . During hallucination periods, the fMRI signal of SMA, IFG, and STS appeared synchronously. The lack of significant latencies between motor and sensory areas suggests that nonclinical hallucinators, like hallucinating schizophrenia patients, may lack the suppression of sensory areas during preparation of speech and motor acts observed in healthy individuals (Ford et al. 2007 ). Our observation of increased activity in primary sensory areas during hallucinations further supports this account and conforms to previous reports of sensory activity during pathological hallucinations (Dierks et al. 1999; van de Ven et al. 2005; Oertel et al. 2007; Ford et al. 2009 ). A further difference was in the activation of the right inferior parietal cortex, which was only observed during hallucinations. Inferior parietal activity has been associated with the processing of external agency (Farrer and Frith 2002) , which may be related to the experience of the voices as being externally generated.
Clinical and Nonclinical Hallucinations
We investigated hallucinators who did not fulfill the criteria for a recognized mental disorder and, unlike most psychiatric patients with AVH, were not distressed by their voices. The advantage of this approach lies in the opportunity to study the perceptual phenomenon of AVH in a relatively pure form, without the concomitant effects of psychopathology (such as delusions) or medication.
In conclusion, hallucinations and AI share activity in STS and other auditory perception areas, which may be associated with the self-generated perception of human voices. However, the temporal association between action planning and perception areas differentiates hallucinations from AI, which suggests that subjective control may be represented in the temporal network dynamics of motor and sensory areas. 
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